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Verifiable signature sharing (VS) was introduced by Franklin and Reiter
in ‘‘Eurocrypt ’95’’ (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 921, pp. 5063,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995). VS enables the recipient of a digital signature,
who is not necessarily the original signer, to share that signature among n
proxies so that a subset of them can later reconstruct it. Efficient protocols
were also given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, Schnorr, and DSS signatures.
However, their RSA and Rabin VS protocols were subsequently broken and
their DSS VS lacks a formal proof of security. We present new protocols for
RSA, Rabin, and DSS VS. Our protocols are efficient and provably secure
and can tolerate the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies. The RSA
VS scheme is based on a completely novel approach. The recipient of the
signature will not share it using conventional secret sharing schemes, but
instead will simply encrypt it using a threshold cryptosystem, i.e., a public
key whose matching secret key is kept shared at the proxies. She will then
also provide the proxies with a proof that the ciphertext indeed contains a
signature. The crux of the problem was to design a threshold cryptosystem
that would make such a proof efficient. We present several variants of our
basic scheme, one of which requires no interaction between the recipient of
the signature and the proxies to establish such a proof and one in which the
reconstruction of the signature by the proxies is completely non-interactive.
The RSA VS scheme can be easily adapted to Rabin’s signatures. The DSS
VS scheme is a modified version of the ElGamal VS scheme mentioned
above which allows for a proof of security. The main application of VS is
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the incorporation of digital cash into multiparty protocols, e.g., cash escrow
and secure distributed auctions. Our protocols thus provide simple, efficient,
and secure solutions for those applications. Furthermore we believe that
some of our techniques are of independent interest. Some of the by-products
of our main result are a new threshold cryptosystem, a new undeniable
signature scheme, and a way to create binding RSA cryptosystems.  2000
Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of verifiable signature sharing (VS) was introduced by Franklin
and Reiter in [20]. VS enables the recipient of a digital signature, who is not
necessarily the original signer, to share such a signature among n proxies so that
a subset of them can later reconstruct it. A VS protocol is divided into a sharing
phase and a recover phase. At the end of the sharing phase each proxy can verify
that a valid signature for the given document can be reconstructed. At the end of
the recover phase such a signature is reconstructed no matter what a malicious
subset of proxies may do.
Previous Work. In [20] efficient protocols were given for RSA, Rabin, ElGamal,
Schnorr, and DSS signatures. However, their RSA and Rabin VS protocols were
subsequently broken in [8]. Also their DSS VS achieves only a heuristic form of
security.
A unifying approach to VS, based on homomorphisms of secret sharing schemes,
is shown by Burmester in [4]. The approach is very elegant and also secure;
however, its generality does not yield extremely efficient protocols when applied to
typical real-life signature schemes.
Thus, the question of efficient and provably secure VS schemes for RSARabin
and DSS was still open.
Our Contribution. In this paper we present new protocols for RSA, Rabin, and
DSS VS. Our protocols are efficient and provably secure. They can tolerate a
malicious sharer (who tries to share something different from a valid signature) and
the malicious behavior of up to half of the proxies during sharing or reconstruction
time.
Motivation. It is important to note that VS can be solved in theory using
known cryptographic techniques for zero-knowledge proofs [31, 28] and multi-
party computation [29, 3, 6]. These solutions are hardly practical. We focus instead
on practical solutions since there are several real-life applications which would
greatly benefit from secure and efficient VS protocols. In order to motivate the
problem we present first some of the more interesting applications in which VS
can be used.
The main application of VS is the incorporation of digital cash into multiparty
protocols. Consider the example of cash escrow, where digital cash can be represented
as the bank’s signature on a digital coin or e-check. By using VS financial institutions
can divide the cash among a set of authorities so that only through the cooperation
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of a threshold of them it is possible to spend it, yet the authorities can verify that
they collectively have the cash. A related application is secure distributed auctions,
where bidders at an auction may be required to verifiably share signatures on
checks for the amount of their bids. This way it will be impossible for the winner
of the bid to default (since the proxies can reconstruct his check), while the
payments of the losers will never be recovered.
More generally VS is useful when a signed document should become valid only
under certain conditions. By verifiably sharing the signature, one makes sure that
the signature will be recovered if and only if such conditions are created.
Other Applications. We believe that parts of our solution are relevant on their
own.
For example, in Section 3 we present a new threshold cryptosystem which is
possibly of independent interest.
VS protocols are somewhat related to undeniable signatures (introduced by
Chaum in [5]), i.e., signatures that can be verified only with the help of the signer.
RSA-based undeniable signatures were recently introduced in [26]. Our RSA
construction can be seen as an alternative to [26] (though admittedly a less
efficient scheme).
Interestingly the structure of our RSA VS protocol can also be used to construct
binding RSA cryptosystems. In [42] the concept of binding cryptography was
introduced. In a binding public-key cryptosystem the sender encrypts a message
under both the public key of the receiver and the public key of a third party and
proves in (noninteractive) ZK that the two ciphertexts contain the same message.
In [42] a scheme for binding ElGamal was presented. We show that our RSA VS
scheme can be used to construct binding RSA public key encryptions.
Details about these applications can be found in Section 6.
1.1. Overview of Our Solution
Let Bob be the signer, Alice be the recipient of the signature, and P1 , ..., Pn be
the proxies (see Section 2 for a detailed description of the model).
The RSA scheme. Let (NB , vB) be Bob’s RSA public key. The matching signing
key is sB such that sBvB=1 mod ,(NB). We assume the standard ‘‘hash-and-sign’’
paradigm (although our technique extends to other schemes like [2]). Alice receives
a message M from Bob and Bob’s signature S=msB mod NB on it where m=H(M)
for some collision-resistant hash function H. Alice wants to verifiably share the
value S among the proxies P1 , ..., Pn . That is, at the end of the sharing phase the
proxies must be assured that they hold shares of Bob’s signature on m (from now
on we will drop the hashing step since it is irrelevant to our purposes).
Our new RSA VS scheme is based on a completely novel approach. Alice will
not share S using conventional secret sharing schemes, but instead she will encrypt
S using a threshold cryptosystem, i.e., a public key whose matching secret key is
kept shared at the proxies. That is, she gives to the proxies the values m and CS=
EEK (S), where E is a public key encryption scheme and the decryption key DK is
shared at the proxies; i.e., each proxy Pi has a share DKi of a t-out-of-n secret
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sharing of DK. At this point all we need is a mechanism to convince the proxies
that the decryption of CS is really the signature S on m without revealing S.
The crux of the problem was to design a threshold cryptosystem that would
make such a proof efficient. The main idea here is to use the ElGamal encryption
scheme [13, 14] over the same composite modulus NB over which the signature was
computed. This will allow us to construct efficient methods to convince the proxies
that the ciphertext contains the signature. We present two such methods.
(1) One is for Alice to provide a zero-knowledge proof [31] that CS contains S.
We present an efficient ZK proof for this task.
(2) The other variant relies on the proxies using their private key to decrypt
a message C S publicly computable from CS . If such decryption equals the message m,
then the proxies are guaranteed that CS contains the signature S.
Method (1) is more efficient for the proxies, but requires interaction with Alice.
Method (2) is more efficient for Alice and requires no interaction between her and
the proxies.
The solution is described in detail in Section 4.
The DSS scheme. The DSS VS scheme is a modified version of the ElGamal VS
scheme from [20] which allows for a proof of security. The solution is described
in Section 5.
1.2. Related Work
Some ideas in our new RSA VS scheme have appeared previously in the
literature although in different contexts and with different usage.
Performing secret sharing by encrypting a value with a symmetric key that is
shared among the proxies appeared first in [32] as a way to shorten the size of
shares in computationally secure secret sharing schemes. The specific idea of using
threshold cryptosystems to ‘‘bootstrap’’ secret sharings (exclusively for efficiency
reasons) appeared in [9, 22].
The idea of encrypting a signature and then proving in ZK that the ciphertext
contains a valid signature has appeared in several places. In [10] it was proposed
as a general paradigm to construct undeniable signatures, but the specific efficient
solutions work only for ElGamal-like signatures. In [1] this technique was used to
construct fair exchange of digital signatures between two parties using an offline
trusted center. The paper is not concerned with using a threshold cryptosystem for
encrypting the signature. Moreover, they present general solutions for RSA and
DSS signatures using any kind of public-key encryption but employing inefficient
binary cut-and-choose ZK proofs which require a number of public-key operations
proportional to the security parameter.
Stadler in [41] uses ElGamal over a composite to verifiably encrypt e-roots. If
one attempts to share such encryptions, this scheme can only deal with additive
access structures, thus resulting in an O(nt) exponential blow-up to achieve a t-out-
of-n threshold scheme.
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The construction of an ElGamal-like threshold cryptosystem over a composite
modulus uses techniques from the areas of threshold [16, 12, 11, 17, 24] and
proactive [18, 19, 38] RSA signature schemes. In particular we combine the techni-
ques of [19, 38] in order to improve efficiency.
It is important also to remind the reader of the difference between VS and
related cryptographic objects (see [20] for a good discussion of this issue). VS
is related but different from threshold signature schemes: in the latter the secret key
is shared so that a set of n people can produce signatures if a threshold of t
cooperates. Note that a threshold signature scheme trivially gives a VS scheme
when the signature sharer coincides with the signer. But in general this is not true.
VS also bear some relationship to fair public-key cryptosystems (FPKC) [34] in
which one has to share a secret key and prove that the shared secret is indeed the
inverse of a given public key. Indeed both VS and FPKC are examples of struc-
tured VSS protocols (to use the terminology in [34]), i.e., verifiable secret sharing
protocols in which the dealer has to prove some additional property about the
secret being shared (and not just that such a unique secret exists).
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. The Model
We assume there are three entities. The signer (which in the following we will
usually call Bob), the recipient (Alice) and a set of n proxies, P1 , ..., Pn . The VS
protocol will be between Alice and the proxies and must not involve Bob.
We assume that Alice and the proxies are connected by a full network of private
channels and by a broadcast channel. These assumptions allow us to focus on a
high-level description of the protocols. However, it is worth noting that these
abstractions can be substituted with standard cryptographic techniques for privacy,
commitment and authentication. In some of the variations of our protocols it will
not be necessary to have private channels between Alice and the proxies.
We assume that there exist an adversary A who can corrupt Alice and at most
t of the proxies. By corrupting a player, A can read his memory and cause him to
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. We assume the adversary is static, i.e., the set
of corrupted players is decided at the beginning of the computation of a protocol.
Finally we assume communication is synchronous. We do, however, allow for
rushing adversaries, i.e., adversaries who decide the messages of the bad players at
round R after having seen the messages of the good players at the same round.
Notation. In the rest of the paper n will denote the number of proxies and
L=n!.
2.2. Tools
Secret Sharing. We will use the polynomial-based t-out-of-n secret sharing
scheme due to Shamir [39]. Let q be a prime: given a secret _ # Zq , the dealer
chooses at random a polynomial f (z)=_+ tj=1 ajz
j of degree t and gives to
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player Pi a share _i= f (i) mod q. Clearly t players have no information about the
secret while t+1 can reconstruct it by polynomial interpolation. Note that a
(n&1)-out-of-n secret sharing can be obtained simply by sharing _ as a sum
_=_1+ } } } +_n .
Verifiable Secret Sharing. Basic secret sharing protocols cannot cope with a
malicious dealer who gives out random points that do not lie on a polynomial of
degree t andor with malicious players who contribute false shares at reconstruction
time. A verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol [7] solves these problems. Here we
recall Feldman’s VSS [15]. The dealer follows Shamir’s scheme but in addition he
broadcasts the values :0= g_ mod p and :j= gaj mod p where p is a prime such
that q divides p&1 and g is an element of order q in Zp*. The : values will allow
the players to check that the values _i really define a secret by checking that g_i=
> j : i
j
j mod p. If the value they hold is inconsistent they complain about the dealer
who will reveal their share (that should match the above equation). The : values
also allow detection of incorrect shares _$i at reconstruction time. This protocol can
tolerate any t<n2 malicious faults including the dealer.
Note that the value of the secret is only computationally secure; e.g., the value
g_ mod p is leaked. To avoid this problem it is possible to use Pedersen’s VSS [36]
which protects the secret in an information-theoretic sense. In this implementation
the dealer chooses a second t-degree polynomial f $= j b jz j and sends the value
{i= f $(i) mod p to player Pi in addition to the share _i as above. The dealer then
commits to each coefficient of the polynomials f, f $ as follows: he publishes the
values ; j= gaj hbj mod p where h is an element in the subgroup generated by g such
that the discrete log of h in base g is unknown. This will allow the players to check
the received shares by checking that g_i h{i=> j ; i
j
j mod p. At reconstruction time
the players are required to reveal both _i and {i and the above equation is used to
validate the shares. It is possible to prove that the VSS fails if and only if the dealer
or one of the players is able to compute the discrete log of h in base g. Note that
the value of the secret is unconditionally protected since the only value revealed is
;0= g_hb0.
Threshold cryptosystems. Let E be a public key encryption scheme. Formally E
is defined by three randomized algorithms:
Key-Gen (key generation) takes a security parameter as input and returns
a pair (EK, DK) where EK is the public encryption key and DK is the secret
decryption key.
Encrypt takes as input a message M and the public key EK and returns a
ciphertext C also denoted as EEK (M).
Decrypt takes as input a ciphertext C=EEK (M) and the private decryption
key DK and returns M.
A threshold cryptosystem TE for E distributes the operation of key generation and
decryption among a set of n parties P1 , ..., Pn . That is, TE is defined by two
protocols:
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T-Key-Gen: A randomized protocol that returns as public output the public
encryption key EK and as private output for player Pi a value DKi such that
DK1 , ..., DKn constitute a t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing of DK.
T-Decrypt: Each player Pi takes as public input a ciphertext C=EEK (M) and
as secret input his share DKi . Following communication with the other players
(who hold the remaining shares of DK) each player returns as public output the
message M.
The two protocols should be secure; i.e., they should function correctly and reveal
no extra information even in the presence of an adversary that corrupts maliciously
up to t players2. In particular note that the private key DK should not be exposed
during T-Decrypt.
More formally, for any adversary A that corrupts at most t players the following
conditions must be met:
correct key generation: T-Key-Gen generates keys with a probability distribu-
tion which is computationally indistinguishable from Key-Gen.
correct decryption: On input C=EEK (M), T-Decrypt returns as output M.
simulatability: Recall that we define the view V of the adversary A during a
protocol as the set of messages sent and received by the bad players during a run
of the protocol. Consider an execution of T-Key-Gen that generated Y as an output
followed by executions of T-Decrypt on input Ci and output Mi . Let V be the view
of the adversary during that protocol. Then there exists an algorithm S called the
simulator which on input Y, Ci , Mi , and black-box access to A produces output
strings with a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from V.
2.3. Computational Assumptions
In the following we assume N to be a composite modulus, product of two large
primes N= pq. We assume that p, q are safe primes; i.e., there exists two primes
p$, q$ such that p=2p$+1 and q=2q$+1. We denote with ,(N)=( p&1)(q&1)=
4p$q$ the order of the multiplicative group Z*N of the integers modulo N, relatively
prime to N.
Lemma 1. Let N= pq, where p<q, p=2p$+1, q=2q$+1, and p, q, p$, q$ are all
prime numbers. Then, given an element w # Z*N"[&1, 1] such that ord(w)<p$q$ then
either gcd(w&1, N) or gcd(w+1, N) is a prime factor of N.
Proof. If 1<ord(w)<p$q$, then ord(w) # [2, p$, q$, 2p$, 2q$], since the order of
an element must be a divisor of the order of the group. If ord(w)=2, w{&1, then
N | (w&1)(w+1) and then gcd(w&1, N) must be a non-trivial factor of N. In the
case that ord(w)= p$, w p$#1 mod N O w p$#1 mod q. If w#1 mod q then w&1 is
a multiple of q which is smaller than N; otherwise p$ | ,(q)=2q$, a contradiction. A
similar argument holds for ord(w)=q$. Finally in the case that ord(w)=2p$, w2p$#
1 mod N O (w2) p$#1 mod q. If w2=1 mod q then either w&1 or w+1 is a multiple
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2 Note that we are talking about robust protocols that work in the presence of malicious faults. Unless
otherwise noted when we say secure we mean also robust.
of q which is smaller than N; otherwise p$ | ,(q)=2q$, a contradiction. Again a
similar argument holds for ord(w)=2q$. K
Let G0 be a random element in Z*N . A consequence of the above lemma is that,
with overwhelming probability, (unless factoring is easy) the order of G0 is either
p$q$ or 2p$q$. Set G=GL30 mod N. G has order p$q$ (since L is even). For any element
A in the group generated by G we can denote with DLogG A mod N the unique
integer a (modulo ord(G)= p$q$) such that A=Ga mod N, i.e., the discrete log in
base G of A modulo N.
Our RSA VS protocol uses the so-called Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH )
Assumption over a composite modulus. Informally this assumption says that given
two random DiffieHellman public keys A=Ga and B=Gb the resulting shared key
Gab is indistinguishable from a random value to an observer who does not know
any of the secret keys a, b. More formally stated (see [30] for the definition of
computational indistinguishability):
Assumption 2. Let N be a composite modulus product of two large primes. Let
G be a random element of Z*N and G the subgroup generated by it. Consider the two
probability distributions on G3 defined as DH=(Ga, Gb, Gab) modulo N and R=
(Ga, Gb, Gc) modulo N for a, b, c chosen randomly and uniformly in ZN . We assume
that the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
The decisional DiffieHellman assumption is related to the regular DiffieHellman
assumption that says that given Ga and Gb one cannot compute Gab in polynomial
time. Clearly this assumption relies on the hardness of computing discrete logs.
Reductions in the inverse direction are not known.
ElGamal over a composite. We are going to use the following variation of the
ElGamal encryption scheme [13, 14] over a composite modulus [33, 40]. The
public encryption key is EK=(N, G0 , G, Y) where N, G0 and G are as described
above. Y is computed as Y=GX mod N with X #R ZN . X is the secret decryption
key. A message M is encrypted under EK by choosing a random K #R ZN and com-
puting A=GK0 mod N and B=Y
K } M mod N. The ciphertext is the pair (A, B).
Decryption of a pair (A, B) is computed by taking M=BAX } L3 mod N.
The ElGamal encryption scheme can be thought of as a one-time pad with a one-
time Diffie-Hellman key (the value YK=GXK). Thus, if the message M is in the
same group generated by G it is an easy task to show that the DDH implies the
semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme (semantic security defined in
[30] means that it is impossible for an observer to distinguish between the encryp-
tion of two messages). If the message space is larger than the group generated by
G then the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is a seemingly
stronger assumption than the DDH.
2.4. Definition of Verifiable Signature Sharing
We follow the ideas in the definition of VS presented in [20], although we
believe our formalization to be simpler and more rigorous.
VS consists of a pair of protocols (Share, Recover) for Alice and the proxies.
The input of Share for all the players is a message m and the public verification
58 CATALANO AND GENNARO
key VK of the signer. The secret input for Alice is a signature S of m under the
signer’s key. The output of Share for each proxy Pi is a value Si , which can
assume the special value Si=| denoting that the proxy has rejected the sharing.
The protocol Recover is then run on the output of Share by the proxies.
Definition 3. We say that VS=(Share, Recover) is a verifiable signature
sharing protocol with fault-tolerance t if for any adversary A that can corrupt Alice
and at most t proxies the following conditions are met:
completeness: If Alice is not corrupted then the output of Recover is a
signature S on m under the signer’s key VK.
soundness: If a good proxy Pi outputs Si=| at the end of Share then each
good player Pj outputs Sj=|. If S i {| for good players then the output of
Recover is a signature S on m under the signer’s key VK.
security: Define the view V of the adversary A as the set of messages (includ-
ing the broadcasted ones) sent and received by the bad players during the Share
protocol. Then there exists an algorithm S called the simulator which on input m
and VK and with black-box access to A produces output strings with a distribution
which is computationally indistinguishable from V.
We accept a negligible probability (over the coin tosses of the players) that these
conditions are violated.
Informally, completeness means that if Alice really shares the right signature,
then, no matter what malicious proxies do, the signature will be recovered at the
end. Soundness means that if Alice is malicious, then either she will be caught
trying to cheat (i.e., sharing something different from a valid signature) or she will
share a valid signature anyway. Security finally says that a run of Share gives the
adversary no information he could not compute on his own from the message and
the public key. In particular (unless the signature scheme is not secure) no informa-
tion about the signature S is revealed.
3. A NEW THRESHOLD CRYPTOSYSTEM
Our RSA VS scheme relies on a new ElGamal-based threshold cryptosystem
which we present in this section. We believe this new threshold cryptosystem to be
of independent interest. Although the construction of this ElGamal-based threshold
cryptosystem is new, the techniques used in this section appear in several papers
related to threshold [16, 12, 17, 24] and proactive [18, 19, 38] RSA signature
schemes.
An example of a threshold cryptosystem for ElGamal over a prime modulus can
be found in [35]. However, there are several complications that arise from trying
to generalize the approach in [35] to work for ElGamal modulo a composite.
First, for our application, we require that the modulus N, without its factoriza-
tion, is given as a parameter to the key generation protocol3. This implies that the
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3 Jumping ahead, N will be the same modulus from Bob’s public key.
File: 571J 168510 . By:SD . Date:17:07:00 . Time:10:04 LOP8M. V8.B. Page 01:01
Codes: 2275 Signs: 1560 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
OPGELET PAGE 3p BREDER
value ,(N) is unknown to the parties who have to jointly choose and share X. Our
threshold cryptosystem overcomes this problem using techniques first presented in
[19] for the application of proactive RSA.
3.1. Feldman’s VSS over a Composite
First we present how to modify Feldman’s VSS to work modulo a composite of
unknown factorization. This protocol was presented in [19]. They used it as a
crucial tool to refresh shares of a proactive RSA signature scheme. We slightly
modified it to work as a component of our key generation protocol. The main idea
behind the protocol is for the dealer to share the secret _ over the integers (since
he does not know ,(N)). The coefficients of the sharing polynomial must be chosen
large enough to statistically hide information (this is evident from the proof of
security). The protocol appears in Fig. 1.
The following Lemma appears (without proof) in [19]. The correctness part of
our proof is original, while the privacy part is mostly based on a similar proof
from [38].
Lemma 2. Feldman-Zn-VSS is a VSS of fault-tolerance t for any t, n such
that n>2t.
Proof. At the end of the sharing phase of Feldman-ZN-VSS the values :0 , ..., :t
determine the unique polynomial of degree t, f (z)=L(DLogG :0)+ti=1 (DLogG :i) z
i,
modulo ord(G)= p$q$. Since all the shares held by the honest players satisfy Eq. (1) we
know that _i= f (i) mod p$q$ for a good player Pi . At the end of the sharing phase the
unique secret determined by the shares of the good players is defined as _= f (0)L.
FIG. 1. Feldman’s VSS over a composite modulus.
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We now need to prove that at the end of the reconstruction phase the recovered
value is really _. Since reconstruction is carried via interpolation over the integers,
if a player Pi reveals an integer _^i {_i but satisfying Eq. (1), then the interpolation
could fail. But if Eq. (1) is satisfied, it means that G_i=G_^i mod N, i.e., the
difference $=_i&_^i is a multiple of the order of G. Since the order of G is p$q$, we
have that 4$ is a multiple of ,(N) and thus Pi is able to factor the modulus.
Finally we need to prove that an adversary controlling t players has no informa-
tion about the secret _ except for the value G_. We prove this by showing that the
view of the adversary at the end of the sharing phase can be produced by a
simulator on input value :0=G_ mod N. Without loss of generality we can assume
that the adversary corrupts the first t players P1 , ..., Pt .
First of all we show that the distribution of t shares of a secret _ with polynomial
f (z) is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of t shares that result
from sharing a random secret \ with polynomial r(z). We prove this by proving
that with high probability there is a sharing of a random value \ # [&N2 } } } N2]
using a polynomial r with integer coefficients in the same range as f such that r(i)= f (i)
for i=1, ..., t. Define a t-degree polynomial h(z) such that h(0)=(_&\)L and
h(1)= } } } =h(t)=0. That is,
h(z)= :
t
i=0
h(i) ‘
j{i, j=0, ..., t
z& j
i& j
=L(_&\) ‘
j=1, ..., t
z& j
& j
and the coefficient of zi is
L(_&\) :
B[1, ..., t], |B|=i
> j # B (& j)
> j=1..., t (& j)
.
Note that because L=n! this value is an integer. It can also be bounded in absolute
value by
:
B[1, ..., t], |B|=i
L(_&\)(_&\) L \ti+
(_&\) Lt!
i ! (t&i)!
(_&\) Lt!L2N2.
The desired polynomial is r(z)= f (z)&h(z). Now r(0)=L\ , and its coefficients are
integers in the range [&L2N3&L2N 2 } } } L2N3+L2N2]; thus, the probability that
the coefficients are outside the legal range is t(2L2N 2)(2(L2N3+L2N 2))tN
which is negligible.
Now we have to show the full simulation of Feldman-ZN -VSS. The simulator
receives the value :0=G_ and it has to produce an indistinguishable view for the
adversary. The simulator shares a random value \ with a random polynomial r(z)
and gives to the adversary the t shares _i=r(i) mod N for i=1, ..., t. As we proved
above the distribution of these values is statistically close to the real one. Now the
simulator has to produce the public output :i ’s. Define the polynomial f (z)=
ti=0 _i > j{i (z& j)(i& j ) where _0=L_. Clearly f (i)=_i for i=1, ..., t. We now
need to show that we can efficiently compute G to the coefficients of f (z). Rearrang-
ing the terms we can see that the coefficient of zk is ak= ti=0[*ik _ i> j{i (i& j)]
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where the *i, k are known constants. There is a problem however, in computing Gak
because of the presence of the fractions since we cannot extract roots modulo N.
But recall that we defined G=GL30 . Thus,
Gak=G
t
i=0 [*ik_i> j{i (i& j)]= ‘
t
i=0
G*i, k _i>j{i (i& j)=G_0*0, k(&1) tt! ‘
t
i=1
G*i, k _i > j{i (i& j)
=:0L*0, k(&1)
tt! ‘
t
i=1
(G_i*i, k
0
)L
3 >j{i (i& j).
Note that all the exponents are integers now. K
Remark 1. Note that if the dealer is honest, then the reconstructed value _ at
the end of Feldman-ZN-VSS is always going to be an integer. However if the dealer
is malicious, the interpolation could yield a fractional value for _. If T is a subset
of t+1 accepted shares then the Lagrange interpolation formula tells us that
L_= :
i # T
*i_ i
> j # T, j{i (i& j)
and thus
_= :
i # T
* i_i
L > j # T, j{i (i& j)
.
As we noted above > j # T, j{i (i& j) is a divisor of L2. Thus, we can conclude that
even if the dealer is malicious, we have that L3_ is an integer.
3.2. Key Generation Protocol
We are now ready to show the key generation protocol for the threshold
ElGamal scheme.
The general idea follows the one of Pedersen [35] for the case of discrete-log
cryptosystems in a prime field. Each player Pi shares a random value xi via Feldman’s
VSS. The secret key x will be the sum of those random values, while the public key
y= gx is easily computable from the public information of the VSS protocols. The
key generation continues by having each player sum up the shares he received to
create his own share of the secret key for a t-out-of-n secret sharing.
There are two difficulties with the above approach however:
v Since each player performing the Feldman’s VSS protocol (as dealer) reveals
gxi it is possible for a rushing adversary to choose the xi ’s of the bad players so that
a specific y= gx will appear. Even if the adversary were not rushing, it would be
possible for her during rounds 34 to ‘‘pull out’’ some bad players (by having them
disqualified) in order to affect the value of y. At the end it is not possible to prove
that the pair x, y is built with the right (uniform) distribution. This problem was
first noted by [25]. Their solution, which we are going to employ in this paper, is
to perform an information-theoretically secure VSS first for xi (for example, Pedersen’s
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VSS) and then on top of that (using the same sharing polynomial) perform the checks
required by Feldman’s VSS. This has the effect of forcing the decision of the adversary
when the xi ’s are information-theoretically secure and thus the choice of the adversary
is independent from the ones of the good players.
v When working over a composite modulus the threshold decryption protocol
is unnecessarily cumbersome if the key is represented in a t-out-of-n fashion. Thus,
we follow a different approach. Each player will keep as a share of the secret key
the random value he originally shared: this is a (n&1)-out-of-n secret sharing. The
shares a player received during Feldman-ZN-VSS will be used for backup in case
some other player fails during the decryption protocol. This paradigm was intro-
duced by [38] and called share-backup.
The protocol TEG-Key-Gen (for threshold ElGamal key generation) appears in Fig. 2.
3.3. Decryption Protocol
We are now left to show the decryption protocol. The approach is the same as
the decryption protocol modulo a prime in [35], but it uses the techniques from
[19, 38] to make it work modulo a composite.
The idea is to get a partial decryption from each player by exponentiating the
ciphertext to his own additive (not threshold!) share of the secret key. Since the
secret key is the sum of the additive shares, the product of the partial decryptions
will be the correct decryption. To prevent bad players from contributing bad partial
decryption we force them to prove in ZK that they are correct with respect to the
witnesses generated during the key generation protocol. The ZK proof for this task
is described in [24]. The protocol TEG-Decrypt appears in Fig. 3.
FIG. 2. A Pedersen-like joint key generation with share-backup.
63PROTOCOLS FOR VERIFIABLE SIGNATURE SHARING
File: 571J 168514 . By:SD . Date:17:07:00 . Time:10:05 LOP8M. V8.B. Page 01:01
Codes: 3114 Signs: 2139 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
OPGELET PAGE IS 3p BREDER
FIG. 3. Threshold decryption for ElGamal over a composite.
Theorem 5. TEG=(TEG-Key-Gen, TEG-Decrypt) is a secure threshold crypto-
system for ElGamal over a composite with fault-tolerance t for any t, n such that
n>2t.
Proof. First of all we have to prove that the distribution of the public key
generated by the protocol is almost the same as if it was generated by a centralized
user. The distribution of Y is induced by the distribution of X mod ,(N) (since
ord(G) is a divisor of ,(N)). In the centralized case X is chosen in ZN with uniform
probability. This results in a distribution which is statistically close to uniform for
X mod ,(N). So we need to prove that when X is generated by the protocol,
X mod ,(N) has a distribution which is also statistically close to uniform. Here
X=i # Good xi , where some of the xi ’s are under the control of the adversary. In
other words we can write X=XA+XH mod ,(N) where XA is chosen by the
adversary while XH is determined by the honest players. It is important to note that
XA can follow any arbitrary distribution but it is independent from XH since the
adversary decides on it at the end of Pedersen’s VSS when she has no information
about the xi ’s chosen by the honest players. Thus we can consider XA as a fixed
constant and it is enough to prove that XH is distributed almost uniformly over
Z,(N) . Assume w.l.o.g. that the first t+1 players are the honest ones, then XH=
t+1i=1 xi mod ,(N). Choose two arbitrary values Z1 and Z2 in Z,(N) and consider
2Z1 , Z2=|Prob[XH=Z1]&Prob[XH=Z2]|.
If a vector (x1 , ..., xt+1) where each xi # [&N2, ..., N 2] generates Z1 then the
(x1 , ..., xt , xt+1&Z1+Z2) will generate Z2 . This vector is legal iff |xt+1|<N 2&N
<N2&,(N) which does not happen with probability <1N. Since we can ‘‘fix’’
any of the components of the vector it turns out that we can upper bound
2Z1 , Z2<\ 1N+
t+1
.
Thus, the difference between the distribution of XH and the uniform distribution
over ,(N) is at most 1Nt which is negligible.
Also the correctness of the decryption protocol should be obvious. Since
X=i # Good xi we have that AX=>i # Good Axi. Thus, unless a bad player passes the
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ZK proof with an incorrect partial decryption (which happens with negligible prob-
ability), the message is correctly decrypted.
We need to prove simulatability now. Assume w.l.o.g. that A corrupts players
P1 , ..., Pt .
The simulator S works as follows. First it simulates a run of TEG-Key-Gen that
produces Y as a public key. It runs step 1 of TEG-Key-Gen for the good players
sharing values x^i and receives the messages sent by the players controlled by A. At
this point the simulator knows which of those players are in the Good set and what
are the values they shared (since S controls more than t players.) Let YA=
>i # Good, i # [1, ..., t] Gxi be the component of the key generated by the players con-
trolled by A. S now simulates step 2 as follows: for players Pt+1 , ..., Pn&1 he just
follows the protocol instructions. For player Pn he broadcasts :^n0 , :^n1 , ..., :^nt such
that
v :^n0=YYA >n&1i=t+1 G
x^i.
v Equation (2) is satisfied by the shares held by the players controlled by A.
S can do this via ‘‘extrapolation in the exponent’’ since there are only t shares held
by the corrupted players and because in step 1 the previous VSS was information
theoretically secure.
The output of the simulation is clearly Y and the simulated view of the adversary
is actually identically distributed to the view of a real execution.
Now we need to simulate one run of TEG-Decrypt with ciphertext A, B as input
and output M. S computes C=BM mod N (i.e., C=AX ). For each player Pi ,
i=t+1, ..., n&1 the simulator broadcasts A i=Ax^i mod N. For Pn the simulator
broadcasts the value A n=C(>it Axi >t<in A i) . For players Pt+1 , ..., Pn&1 the
simulator can run the ZK proof since he knows x^i . For Pn the simulator runs a
simulation of the ZK proof (notice that the theorem being proven is true, but the
simulator does not know x^n such that A n=Ax^n mod N and :^n0=Gx^n mod N).
Clearly this part of the simulation is indistinguishable from the real one since the
only difference between the simulated and the real view is the ZK proof carried out
by players Pn . But since the simulation of a ZK proof is indistinguishable from the
real proof the whole view also is. K
Remark 2. Note that in step 1 of TEG-Key-Gen a bad player may deal shares
that do not interpolate to an integer xi . However by the same argument as in
Remark 1 (see Section 3.1) we have that L3x i must be an integer. Thus the com-
putations in step 4 of TEG-Key-Gen and step 2 of TEG-Decrypt can easily be
carried out by all players.
4. SHARING AN RSA SIGNATURE
The problem. Let (NB , vB) be Bob’s RSA public key. The matching signing key
is sB such that sBvB #1 mod ,(NB). Alice receives a message m from Bob with
Bob’s signature S=msB mod NB on it. Alice wants to verifiably share the value S
65PROTOCOLS FOR VERIFIABLE SIGNATURE SHARING
among the proxies P1 , ..., Pn . That is, at the end of the sharing the proxies must be
assured that they hold a sharing of Bob’s signature on m.
The basic paradigm. We depart from the approach used by Franklin and Reiter
[20] of directly sharing the signature S. Instead we follow an alternative approach
to obtain secret sharing by using an encryption of the secret with a key which is
shared at the proxies. Assume that the proxies have established an instance of a
public-key encryption scheme E with public encryption key EK and that the match-
ing secret decryption key DK is shared among them in a t-out-of-n fashion. Then
all Alice has to do to share S among the proxies is to simply give them the value
CS=EEK (S). Indeed t or less proxies have no information about the secret key;
thus, they cannot decrypt S. In order to achieve the verifiability property we need
a proof that CS indeed contains the signature S.
4.1. Achieving Verifiability
A first attempt. The above proof could be constructed using general zero-
knowledge proof techniques, with a loss of efficiency. We tried to devise direct and
efficient proofs for the most commonly used encryption schemes (e.g., RSA itself
and ElGamal) but we were not able to come up with protocols of acceptable4
efficiency. Before describing our successful approach, let us give you a hint of the
difficulties we encountered in this attempt. Assume that the proxies used RSA as
their encryption scheme and that their public key was (NP , eP) (with matching
decryption key being dP). Alice would have created the ciphertext CS=S eP mod NP
and then must have proven in ZK that
((CS)dP mod NP)vB mod NB=m
without knowing either the factorization of NP or NB ! The interaction between
the two groups Z*NP and Z*NB did not allow us to find an efficient way to prove the
above equation. Similar problems would arise if the encryption scheme of the
proxies was ElGamal with a prime modulus.
Achieving verifiability: a different approach. The above problems were induced
by the fact that the ciphertext CS lived in a different, mathematically unrelated,
group than the one in which the signature S is computed and verified. But this need
not necessarily be the case. Indeed the signature S (created under Bob’s public key
(NB , vB)) can be encrypted using an instance of the ElGamal cryptosystem over the
same composite modulus NB .
If (NB , Y, G0 , G) is the public key of the proxies, Alice will encrypt the signature
by choosing a random K # Z*NB and computing AS=G
K
0 mod NB and BS=
YK } S mod NB .
This will allow for an efficient verifiability check using the ZK proof in Fig. 4.
Alice will be the prover and the proxies will be the verifiers. The protocol is based
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FIG. 4. A ZK proof that an ElGamal encryption contains an RSA signature.
on [41] with some efficiency improvements (it is not necessary to repeat it several
times.)
Lemma 3. The protocol EGRSA-ZK-Proof is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge
proof that (AS , BS) is an ElGamal encryption under the key (NB , G0 , G, Y) of the
signature S of m under the key (NB , vB).
Proof. Completeness: Obvious by inspection.
Soundness: Let us assume that the Prover has a nonnegligible probability of
making the Verifier accept in the above protocol. We need to prove that
S=BSAL
3X
S mod NB where X is the secret key Y=G
X mod NB .
If the Prover has a nonnegligible probability of success, it means that after step
1 she must be able to answer a nonnegligible fraction of all possible challenges c.
In particular the Prover on the same first message can answer two challenges5 c1 , c2
such that c2&c1 is relatively prime to ,(NB). Let d=(c2&c1)&1 mod ,(NB). Let
*i , Ti be the answer to challenge ci for i=1, 2. Because of tests (3a) and (3b) we
know that
Ti=
BR
AL3XR \
BS
AL3XS +
ci
mod NB . (3)
From test (3c) we know that
\T2T1 +
vB
=mc2&c1 mod NB .
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5 Note that we are not constructing an extractor for S, so it is not necessary to constructively find
such a pair of challenges, but only to show that they exist.
Raising the above equation to the product dsB (where sB=v&1B mod ,(NB)) we get
\T2T1+
d
=S mod NB ,
but plugging in Eq. (3) we get that S=BSAL
3 X
S mod NB .
Zero-Knowledge: We need to show a simulator for the honest Verifier. The
simulator first chooses c^ uniformly at random in ZNB . It also chooses T uniformly
at random in Z*NB and sets {=T
vB mod NB . It then sets r^={m&c^ mod NB .
The simulator then chooses * uniformly at random in ZN3B . It then sets
AR@=G*
 A&c^S and BR@=Y
* TB&c^S . The simulated transcript is then r^, AR@, BR@ , c^, * , T .
All the quantities have exactly the same distribution as in the real execution
except for the difference between * and * (and the values induced by the choice of
* vs * ). If we show that the distribution of * is statistically indistinguishable from
the one of * we are done. Note that * is uniformly distributed in [0, ..., N 3B].
* is a value in the interval [0 } } } N 3B+NBK]. Let us look at its probability distribution.
Prob[*=l]=
1
NB
:
NB
i=0
Prob[*=l | c=i].
Fix c=i; then Prob[*=l | c=i] is clearly equal to the probability that J=l&iK
and since J is uniformly distributed in [0 } } } N 3B] we have that
Prob[*=l | c=i]={
0
1
N 3B
if l<iK or l>N3B+iK
if iKlN 3B+iK.
Combining the two equations above we get that
Prob[*=l] {

1
N 3B
=
1
N 3B
if l<NBK or l>N 3B
if NBKlN 3B .
This means that the difference between the probability distributions of * and * can
be bounded by 2NBK(1N 3B)(2NB) which is negligible. K
To make the above protocol ZK against any verifier, known techniques given in
[27] can be used. In particular the Verifier can commit to the challenge before the
Prover speaks.
4.2. The Basic Protocol
Outline. Alice receives a message containing m, Bob’s signature S on m, and
Bob’s public key NB , vB . She then does the following. She generates an instance of
the ElGamal encryption scheme over the composite NB . She generates G0 as a
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random power of m (for reasons that will appear clear in the security proof). As
before G is set equal to GL30 mod NB . She selects a random X # [&N
2
B , ..., N
2
B] and
generates the public key (NB , Y, G0 , G) where Y=GX mod NB . She then encrypts
S by selecting a random K # ZNB and setting AS=G
K
0 mod NB and BS=Y
K }
S mod NB . She hands m, NB , vB , G, G0 , Y, AS , BS to the proxies. Then she proves
in ZK that AS , BS is indeed an encryption of the signature S using the EGRSA-ZK-
Proof in Fig. 4. Finally the last thing left is to share X using Feldman-ZN-VSS
from Fig. 1. This will serve as a guarantee to the proxies that they have the correct
decryption key to reconstruct S.
To recover S the proxies will run the reconstruction phase of Feldman-ZN-VSS
and then use X to decrypt S. The protocol is described in Fig. 5.
Notice that this protocol does not make use of the full threshold cryptosystem we
have outlined in the previous section but only of the Feldman-ZN-VSS protocol.
In the next section we will show an alternative protocol which uses the full
threshold cryptosystem in order to improve the efficiency of the scheme for Alice.
Theorem 2. Under the decisional DiffieHellman assumption modulo a composite
the protocol RSA-VS-1 is a secure VS protocol for RSA with fault-tolerance t, for
any n, t with n>2t.
Proof. Completeness is obvious by inspection of the protocol.
To prove soundness first we note that since the proxies are connected by a
broadcast channel, the honest ones will be in agreement as to which values are
accepted or rejected during the RSA-Share-1 phase of the protocol. If they all
accept the shared values it means that
v Alice passed the ZK proof; thus, the ciphertext contains Bob’s signature on
the message and
FIG. 5. Basic RSA VS protocol.
69PROTOCOLS FOR VERIFIABLE SIGNATURE SHARING
v Alice passed the sharing phase of Feldman-ZN -VSS which means that the
proxies have shares of the correct decryption key which will allow them to
reconstruct the signature later. Note that even if Alice is malicious, if she success-
fully completes the sharing phase of Feldman-ZN -VSS then we are guaranteed that
L3X is an integer. Thus, the proxies will be able to compute the exponentiation
A(XL3)S during RSA-Recover-1.
We are left with proving the security of the scheme. Assume w.l.o.g. that the
adversary A corrupts6 the first t proxies P1 , ..., Pt . Here is a simulator S for RSA-
Share-1 (rounds are numbered as in the protocol): recall that S works on input
m, NB , vB but not the signature S:
1. S chooses uniformly at random
v r^ # ZNB and sets G 0=m
r^ mod NB and G =G L
3
0 mod NB .
v X # [&N 2B , ..., N
2
B] and sets Y =G
X mod NB .
v K # ZNB and sets A S=G
K
0 mod NB and B S=Y
K mod NB (i.e., an encryp-
tion of 1 since S does not know the signature).
She sends to the proxies m, NB , vB , r^, Y , A S , B S . The proxies compute G 0 and G .
2. S runs the simulation of the ZK proof EGRSA-ZK-Proof on input
m, NB , vB , G 0 , G , Y , A S , B S .
3. S runs Feldman-ZN-VSS for X as the dealer with the proxies.
Why is the adversary’s view from the simulation indistinguishable from the real
one? There is only one difference: in the real execution AS , BS is an encryption of
S, while in the simulated one A S , B S is an encryption of 1. To distinguish between
the real view and the simulated view would imply that an adversary could dis-
tinguish between encryption of two different messages in the ElGamal encryption
scheme. This would contradict the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme. Since
the basis G0 is chosen as a power of m this means that both messages (1 and S)
are in the group generated by G0 ; thus, the DDH assumption implies the semantic
security of ElGamal, which concludes the proof.
A remark is in order with respect to the simulation of the ZK proof in step (2).
The simulation of a ZK proof is guaranteed to be indistinguishable from the real
execution when the theorem being proven is true. In this case we are running the
simulator on a false theorem (since A S , B S is not an encryption of the signature of
m.) However, note that under the DDH assumption the simulation of the ZK proof
of a false theorem must be indistinguishable from a real proof of a true theorem.
Otherwise such a simulator could be used to break the DDH assumption. K
4.3. An Alternative Protocol
In this section we show a variation of the previous protocol. The reason we
present an alternative protocol is to improve the efficiency of the scheme for Alice.
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FIG. 6. Alternative RSA VS protocol.
Indeed in this scheme we take full advantage of the new threshold cryptosystem
described in Section 3.
The main difference with respect to the previous protocol is that the key genera-
tion for the ElGamal scheme is done distributively by the proxies instead of by
Alice. This will also allow for a very efficient verification that the ciphertext contains
the required signature. Indeed the proxies can verify that the pair (AS , BS) is
constructed correctly by checking that
BvBS
(AvBS )
L3 } X
=
(Y K } S)vB
(GK)X } vB
=
Y K } vB } S vB
Y K } vB
=m mod NB , (4)
i.e., just by running the TEG-Decrypt protocol on the pair (AvBS , B
vB
S ). The full
protocol appears in Fig. 6.
Theorem 3. Under the decisional DiffieHellman assumption modulo a composite
the protocol RSA-VS-1 is a secure VS protocol for RSA with fault-tolerance t, for
any n, t with n>2t.
Proof. The correctness of the protocol is based on the correctness of TEG-
Decrypt. Since an honest Alice would encrypt the signature, clearly at the end of
RSA-Recover the signature will be decrypted.
The soundness of the protocol is also based on the correctness of TEG-Decrypt.
Equation (4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for (AS , BS) to decrypt to the
signature. So either all the proxies reject if Eq. (4) is not satisfied or they will all
accept, but then the signature will be decrypted successfully at the end of RSA-
Recover.
We are left with proving the security of the scheme. Assume w.l.o.g. that
the adversary A corrupts7 the first t proxies P1 , ..., Pt . Here is a simulator S for
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proxies.
RSA-Share-2 (rounds are numbered as in the protocol): recall that S works on
input m, NB , vB but not the signature S:
1. S just sends m, NB , vB and a randomly chosen r^ to the proxies.
2. S runs TEG-Key-Gen for the good players, where the basis is set to be
G =m r^ mod NB . In particular at the end, the values :^ i0=G xi@ are public. Note that
at the end S knows the shares x^ i of the secret key of all the players.
3. S encrypts the value 1 (since it does not know the real signature S) by
choosing a random K #R ZN and broadcasting A S=G K
 mod N and B S=YK
 mod N.
4. At this point the proxies run TEG-Decrypt on (A*=A vBS , B*=B
vB
S ). In
order to get m as the result S will ‘‘cheat.’’ Recall the details of TEG-Decrypt. Each
proxy will broadcast Ai*=(A*)xi@ and prove in ZK that it is correct with respect to
G xi@ which was generated during TEG-Key-Gen. Note that S knows the values Ai*
for i=1, ..., t. For the proxies Pi , i=t+1, ..., n&1 the simulator will broadcast
Ai*=(A*)xi@ and successfully prove in ZK their correctness. For Pn , however, the
simulator will broadcast a value that will make the decryption equal to m: such
value is An*=B*(m } >i<n Ai* ). For Pn , the simulator will run the simulation of
the ZK proof of correctness.
Why is the adversary’s view from the simulation indistinguishable from the real
one? There are two differences:
(a) In the real execution AS , BS is an encryption of S, while in the simulated
one A S , B S is an encryption of 1.
(b) In the real execution the following values (A=GK, :n0=Gxn, An=Axn=
GKxn) constitute a DiffieHellman triplet. In the simulated execution (A =G K ,
:^n0=G x^n, An*) is not necessarily a DH triplet.
To distinguish between the real view and the simulated view would imply that it is
possible to distinguish between the real and simulated values in either one of these
two cases. But this contradicts the DDH assumption (for case (a) the reduction is
based again on the fact that 1, S are in the group generated by G). K
4.4. Comments, Variants and Optimizations
Rabin’s Signatures. Both the protocols RSA-VS described above can easily be
adapted to Rabin’s signatures by simply putting vB=2.
Non-interactive reconstruction. Reconstructing the secret key has the advantage
of making the recover protocol non-interactive. It is worth pointing out that even
in RSA-VS-2 the recover stage can be implemented by reconstructing the secret
key.
No-fault mode. Under normal operations, it may be very likely that there are no
faults in the system. Let us look at the behavior of our protocol in the case where
all players are honest. There will be no complaints in Feldman-ZN -VSS. If we
choose to expose the secret key in RSA-Recover-2, it can be done without runn-
ing n recover phases of Feldman-ZN-VSS since the players will first reveal their
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correct xi values. All runs of TEG-Decrypt will successfully complete without
invoking any share-backup. This is very important for step 4 of RSA-Share-2 and
for RSA-Recover-2. Moreover, in the specific case of RSA-Recover-2 we can
also postpone the ZK proofs of correctness of partial decryptions to after the
alleged signature has been reconstructed. Indeed the proxies can verify (using vB)
if they recovered the valid signature S. If so they are done. Otherwise, it means that
some of the proxies are contributing incorrect partial decryptions and one must
enforce the ZK proofs. Thus, with this approach, under normal operation of the
system (i.e., when there are no faults), reconstruction using TEG-Decrypt is also
noninteractive and requires no ZK proofs. The efficiency gains under normal opera-
tion of the system are quite substantial (see below).
Saving the key generation. In both protocols the generation of the ElGamal key
(either by Alice or jointly by the proxies) can be moved to a preprocessing stage
to make the actual VS protocol faster.
Amortizing the key generation. In protocol RSA-VS-2 the key generation may
also be amortized over several VS when the signatures being shared are all under
the same modulus NB . Consider the scenario of an electronic auctions in which all
the bids must be done by verifiably sharing a check drawn from the same bank. In
this case the proxies will receive several signatures all under the same public key
NB , vB and the key generation protocol TEG-Key-Gen can be done once for all the
shared signatures. This means that all the signatures are encrypted under the same
key. In turn this implies that if only a single signature has to be reconstructed then
the reconstruction must use the decryption protocol instead of recovering the key.
One word of caution, however, is needed in this case. Since now the basis G is
common to all the shared signatures the security of the scheme is based on the
semantic security of ElGamal over a composite where the message space is all of Z*NB .
Efficiency. The protocols are very efficient especially for Alice. We summarize
the computational requirements of the protocol in Fig. 7 reporting upper bounds
on the number of modular exponentiations (in Z*NB) required by each player. The
numbers in parenthesis represent the numbers under normal operation of the
system (i.e., no-fault mode).
FIG. 7. Efficiency numbers (n=numbers of proxies).
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We claim that our protocols are efficient because the work required from each
player does not grow with the security parameter8. With regards to the number of
participants, the table shows that the work required by each player is bounded by
a small polynomial (at most quadratic) in the number of proxies. For a very large
number of proxies this could create a scalability problem. Thus, we envision that
our protocols will be the most practical in situations with a small number of proxies.
All the examples presented in the Introduction do not require a large number of
proxies.
The storage requirements for the proxies are as follows. A share of the signature
S is basically the ciphertext AS , BS plus the shares of the secret key X. In RSA-
VS-1 this totals to r5 log NB , which is optimal. In RSA-VS-2 the share size is
r3n log NB . This is not optimal because of the multiplicative factor of n due to the
share-backup approach in TEG-Key-Gen.
5. SHARING A DSS SIGNATURE
The problem. Recall the DSS signature scheme. The public parameters are a
large prime p, a 160-bit prime q that divides p&1, and an element g of order q in
Zp*. Bob (the signer) has a secret key x which is a random number in Zq . The
matching public key is y= gx mod p. A message M is signed by first hashing it
down via SHA-1, i.e., m=SHA-1(M). Then Bob chooses a random number k #R Zq ,
and computes r= gk mod p mod q and s=k&1(m+xr) mod q. The signature is the
pair (r, s). A signature is verified by computing _=s&1 mod q and checking that
r=(gmyr)_ mod p mod q. In our scheme Alice receives the message M and the pair
(r, s) and she wants to verifiably share the pair (r, s) among the proxies P1 , ..., Pn .
The approach from [20]. We follow the same provably secure approach used in
[20] to verifiably share an ElGamal signature. The main difference between a
(plain) ElGamal signature and DSS9 is that for ElGamal r= gk mod p (without the
extra mod q reduction) and s=k&1(m&xr) (a&instead of a+). The idea in [20]
was for Alice to give out r in the clear to the proxies and to share s via a Feldman
VSS using an appropriate basis for the verification. For some reason (probably
because the extra reduction mod q for r seems at first sight not to allow this
approach) they decided to switch the roles between r and s in the DSS VS . Alice
gives out s in the clear and shares r via Feldman’s VSS. However, their simulation
does not go through, although they claim heuristically that it is secure.
Our approach. We show that a careful adaptation of the ElGamal VS from
[20] can be shown to be secure. Alice gives out r in the clear to the proxies and
shares _=s&1 via Feldman VSS using the basis G= gmyr (which the proxies can
compute on their own from g, y, m, r). Note that by doing this she reveals
r*=G_ mod p. So in order to check that the shared value is really the correct
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8 For example, we do not have k exponentiations for a modulus of size k which we would have had
if the ZK proofs were of the binary cut-and-choose kind.
9 Apart from the way messages are hashed, which is irrelevant for the purpose of VS.
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FIG. 8. A protocol for DSS VS.
signature the proxies must simply check that r* mod q=r. Note that revealing r*
(i.e., the value of r before the reduction mod q) is not a security problem since this
information is easy to get via a simulation (see the proof). Indeed the reduction
mod q of r serves only to shorten the signature and has no security purpose (this
was also noted in [23] and in [43]). The full protocol appears in Fig. 8.
Theorem 4. Protocol DSS-VS is a secure VS protocol for DSS with fault-
tolerance t, for any n, t with n>2t.
Proof. Completeness is obvious since the protocol inherits the property of
successful reconstruction from Feldman’s VSS.
Soundness is also quite clear. If the proxies accept, then the shared value _
satisfies the DSS verification equation when m is the message and r is the first
signature component, i.e., r=(gmyr)_ mod p mod q. So the value reconstructed in
DSS-Recover must be a correct signature.
Security relies once again on simulation. Assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary
corrupts the first t proxies. The simulator S on input p, q, g, y, m works as follows.
It chooses a random k # Zq and computes r*= gk mod p and r=r* mod q. It
simulates Feldman’s VSS with G= gmyr as basis and r* as the public commitment
to the secret being shared. I.e., it generates t values _1 , ..., _t at random in Zq .
Define by f (z)=ti=0 ai z
i the t-degree polynomial in Zq such that f (0)=DLogG r*
and f (i)=_i . We cannot reconstruct the coefficients of f (z) unless we solve discrete
log, but we can compute the values :i=Gai mod p via ‘‘interpolation in the expo-
nent’’ (in particular :0=r*). The simulated view of the adversary is defined as the
t shares _1 , ..., _t and the public values :0 , ..., :t . It is easy to see that the simulated
view has the same distribution of the real one. K
6. OTHER APPLICATIONS
6.1. A New RSA-Based Undeniable Signature
A new undeniable signature scheme. Undeniable signatures were introduced in
[5]. Informally an undeniable signature needs the cooperation of the signer to be
verified. This may be useful in scenarios in which the signer wants to have some
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control on the distribution of authenticated data (e.g., software, where the signer
wants to collect a licensing fee from users). An undeniable signature consists of
three components: a signing algorithm, a confirmation protocol that allows the
signer to confirm legitimate signatures and a disavowal protocol that allows the
signer to prove that an alleged signature is false. An undeniable signature is called
convertible if the signer can publish a short piece of information to convert all
undeniable signatures into publicly verifiable ones. In [10] a general paradigm was
proposed to implement convertible undeniable signatures. The signer chooses a
traditional signature scheme S with public verification key VK and secret signing
key SK. He also chooses an asymmetric encryption scheme E, publishes the encryp-
tion key EK, and keeps the decryption key DK private. To undeniably sign a
message m, the signer publishes CS=EEK (SSK (m)), i.e., an encryption of the signature.
Then one adds ZK proofs to prove or disprove that the ciphertext contains a valid
signature. To convert the signatures it is sufficient to publish DK. In [10] efficient
protocols were presented for ElGamal-like signatures but not for RSA ones.
Our techniques yield an efficient RSA-based undeniable scheme that follows the
[10] paradigm. The signer uses RSA to sign and ElGamal over the same composite
to encrypt the signature. The confirmation protocol is EGRSA-ZK-Proof shown in
Fig. 4.10 The disavowal protocol is described in Fig. 9. It needs to be repeated l
times to achieve probability of error 2&l ; however, this is OK for the denial
protocol since it will be invoked rarely. Note that all the prover needs to know in
order to participate in either the confirmation or the denial protocol is the decryp-
tion key X (which means that the signer can delegate both functions to someone
else and still reserve for himself the power to sign).
The protocol in Fig. 9 is only honest-verifier ZK since a cheating verifier could
learn information about a ciphertext (AR , BR) which she did not generate. To make
it ZK against any verifier standard techniques may be used: the prover would not
reveal the answer b directly but he would rather commit to it. Then the Verifier
would show that she constructed (AR , BR) properly. At that point the Prover
would open the commitment to b .
Lemma 4. The protocol EGRSA-ZK-Denial is a zero-knowledge proof that
(AS , BS) is not an ElGamal encryption under the key (NB , G, Y) of the signature S
of m under the key (NB , vB).
Proof. Completeness: since (AS , BS) is not an encryption of the signature of m,
it means that C1&b is not an encryption of the signature of mr. So the Prover will
be able to guess b correctly all the time.
Soundness: if (AS , BS) is an encryption of the signature of m, both Cb and
C1&b will be encryptions of signatures of the first component. Thus, the Prover will
be able to guess b only with probability 12 .
Zero-Knowledge: The simulator chooses a bit b uniformly at random. He
generates R #R Z*NB and J # R ZNB uniformly at random. He sets r^=R
vB mod NB ,
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of ElGamal.
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FIG. 9. A ZK proof that an ElGamal encryption does not contain an RSA signature.
A R=GJ
 mod NB and B R=YJ
 } R mod NB . Finally he sets C b=(r^, A R , B R) and
C 1&b=( r^m^, A R AS , B RBS). The transcript of the simulation is C b , C 1&b , b which
clearly has the exact same distribution as in the real case. K
In [26] the first RSA-based undeniable signature was presented. Our scheme is
less efficient than [26] and also relies on more assumption (e.g., the security of the
ElGamal encryption).
6.2. Binding RSA
In [42] the concept of binding cryptography was introduced. In a binding
public-key cryptosystem the sender encrypts a message under both the public key of
the receiver and the public key of a third party and proves in (noninteractive) ZK
that the two ciphertexts contain the same message. In [42] a scheme for binding
ElGamal was presented but the problem of binding RSA left open. The main
motivation of [42] was to establish a fraud-detectable key-recovery system: the
third party would be a key recovery agent and because the proof is publicly
verifiable fraudulent messages would be detected. In [37], however, an attack is
presented in which two cooperating players can produce seemingly binding cipher-
texts that would not be decrypted by the key recovery authority. If at least one of
the parties is honest, [37] notices that much more efficient solutions can be devised
by having the receiver check that the key recovery agent can indeed decrypt. This
seems to deprive this approach of its main application area.
However, it is possible that in other models the binding approach may still be
interesting. Consider, for example, a model in which the receiver wants his ISP to
check that incoming encrypted messages are lawfully constructed and does not
want to spend valuable resources by doing the check himself. In general binding
cryptosystems could still be useful in other areas because of their interesting
structure.
Our RSA VS scheme can be used to construct binding RSA public key encryp-
tions. Bob’s public key for encryption is (NB , eB) and the third party uses an
ElGamal key (NB , G, Y=GX ). If Alice wants to send a message m to Bob using a
binding cryptosystem she would encrypt m twice constructing A=GK, B=YK } m,
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and C=meB mod N and prove in ZK that the message contained in C is the same
as the message contained in (A, B). She can use the proof in Fig. 4 for this purpose
(where C is the message and m is its secret signature). The proof can be made non-
interactive in the random oracle model by computing c via a suitable hash of the
theorem statement (Nb , eB , G, Y, A, B, C) and of the first message of the proof
(r, AR , BR).
7. CONCLUSION AND AN OPEN PROBLEM
We presented new, efficient, and provably secure VS protocols for RSA, Rabin,
and DSS signature schemes. This problem had been open since the introduction of
the concept of VS in [20] as their RSARabin protocols were subsequently
broken and their DSS protocol was not provably secure. Various applications of
our results have also been presented.
We leave the reader with an open problem: our RSA VS scheme is provably
secure under an assumption which is not known to be weaker than the RSA
assumption itself. It would be nice to have an RSA VS scheme which is provably
secure just under the RSA assumption.
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